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Abstract
Probability interference is a fundamental characteristic of quantum
mechanics. In this paper we attempt to show with the help of some
examples, where this fundamental trait of quantum physics can be found
back in a social science environment. In order to support our thesis that
interference can possibly be found back in many other macro-scopic areas,
we proceed in setting up an experimental test.
Keywords: sure-thing principle; Ellsberg paradox; Allais paradox; probabil-
ity interference; financial arbitrage; sub(super)-additive probabilities; Heisen-
berg Uncertainty Principle; information function; rational ignorance; ambiguity
1 Introduction
The concept of ‘probability interference’ is one of the most fundamental concepts
of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics, as a discipline of physics, models
quantum mechanical phenomena which typically are found at scales well below
the nuclear level. Hence, it may come as a surprise that quantum physical
methodology can be used in a setting which is substantially far removed from
the quantum mechanical scale: i.e. the macro-scopic scale. In this paper we
attempt to convince the reader that the use of precisely such methodology can
be used in a beneficial way in a social science setting. More precisely, in this
paper, we focus our efforts to purposefully show how basic quantum physical
concepts can be used to explain experimentally observed violations of a very
basic principle in economic theory: the so called sure-thing principle1.
In order to begin to achieve this purpose we must first explain what proba-
bility interference is. Then, after we will have explained the essential meaning of
the sure-thing principle, we proceed to illustrating, following the path-breaking
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1This principle is a key building block in some expected utility theories. Please see section
3.
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arguments by Busemeyer et al. (2006 and 2007), how the violation of this prin-
ciple can be explained with the help of probability interference. In this paper
we also highlight two important paradoxes, the so called Allais and Ellsberg
paradoxes, where the latter paradox is an example of where the sure thing prin-
ciple goes wrong. We briefly illustrate how the Allais paradox is related to the
‘double slit’ experiment, which is the fundamental experiment used in quantum
mechanics to argue for the presence of probability interference.
To further underline the importance of the Ellsberg paradox and its connec-
tions with quantum mechanical tools, we set ourselves two further main aims in
this paper.
As a first further main aim, we proceed first to show how information can
be modelled via the wave function - a central concept in quantum mechanics.
We then attempt to show that ambiguity, a main characteristic of the Ellsberg
paradox, can be modelled with the help of such wave function. Following this,
we also highlight how ‘ignorance’ about ambiguity can be related to the same
basic quantum mechanical concept.
As a second further main aim, we would like to propose how we can test for
the existence of probability interference in a macro-scopic setting. If the pro-
posed test can be seen as a potentially conclusive test by which such interference
can be experimentally verified, we will have added one more argument in sup-
port of why the violation of the sure-thing principle could indeed be explained
by probability interference.
In the next section of the paper we acquaint the reader with the notion of
the double slit experiment and the ensuing probability interference. In section
3 of the paper, we first discuss the sure-thing principle and the related Ellsberg
paradox. We also explain the Allais paradox and briefly argue how this para-
dox is related to the double slit experiment (the experiment which triggers the
existence of probability interference). In section 4, we highlight, following the
important work of Busemeyer et al. (2006 and 2007), how probability interfer-
ence can help in explaining the violation of the sure-thing principle. In section
5, we define ‘ambiguity’ via the Ellsberg paradox. In section 6, we attempt to
show how information can be modelled via the use of the wave function. In
section 7, we then proceed in showing how ambiguity can be modelled via the
wave function. In section 8, we show how ignorance about ambiguity can again
be modelled by this same device. In section 9, we provide for a detailed descrip-
tion of an experimental test we propose to prove the existence of probability
interference.
2 The double slit experiment and probability in-
terference
The notion of probability interference is closely tied to one of the most fun-
damental experiments in quantum physics: the double slit experiment. This
experiment consists of an electron gun which basically produces a beam of elec-
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trons, and an electron detector. The detector counts the number of electrons
landing on a given area. We imagine there are two slits of equal width. Both
slits, let us call them slits A and B, are separated by a certain distance from
each other. The experiment consists of three scenarios:
1. slit A is open and slit B is closed
2. slit A is closed and slit B is open
3. slit A is open and slit B is open
Before any electron gun is activated, let us first imagine what would happen
if the electron gun were instead to be a gun firing out very small plastic balls.
We imagine those balls diameter to be very small compared to the length of
each slit. In scenario 1, when the plastic ball gun is activated, we would expect
that the plastic balls would pile up behind slit A and very few plastic balls
would pile up behind slit B (some would pile up there because they would be
scattered at the edges of slit A). The opposite pattern would occur for scenario
2. When both slits are open we would imagine there would be a density of balls
piling up behind slit A and a comparable density of balls piling up behind slit
B. Some density of balls would occur in between the slits because some of the
balls would be scattered at the edges of each of the slits A and B.
The big question, loosely speaking then, becomes whether if with the electron
gun one will observe the same pattern? We follow here Morrison (1990). Assume
that both slits A and B are open. It occurs that once the electron gun is opened,
initially spots form, randomly behind the slits. However, after some time the
electrons start forming an interference pattern. As is remarked in Morrison
(1990) at first, the electrons behave like particles. However, when time moves
on they start behaving like waves. Even if the electron gun fires off one electron
at a time (passing through one of the slits) there is still interference (i.e. the
electron interferes with itself)! This experiment, with the electron gun, shows
that electrons go through both slits. Interference forms even when one electron
goes through a slit. This result is indeed resolutely remote from what we would
expect if the electrons were plastic balls.
Quantum physicists devised a probability formula to describe those quite
mysterious events. We still follow Morrison (1990)2. Busemeyer et al (2006)
also provide for a very intuitive background on the discussion which is now
following.
Let us denote with pA(x, t) the probability that the electron arrives at posi-
tion x at time t when slit A is open and similarly for pB(x, t). What would be
the expression for the probability of finding an electron at position x at time t
when both slits are open? I.e. what is pAB(x, t)? Will it be:
pAB(x, t) = pA(x, t) + pB(x, t)? (1)
2We slighlty alter the notation from Morrison (1990).
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This formulation is not reflecting the interference pattern found when consid-
ering electrons in the double slit experiment. We remark that pAB(x, t) should
remind us of the probability we use to denote the probability of the union of
two mutually exclusive events A and B:
P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B). (2)
It is not possible to capture interference by superposing probability distri-
butions. Instead one could superpose probability waves, which we denote as
ψA(x, t) for when slit A is open and ψB(x, t) for when slit B is open. An alter-
native name for probability wave, which is often used, is probability amplitude.
The relationship between the probability wave and the probability density is as
follows:
|ψ(x, t)|2 ∝ probability density function. (3)
We remark that |ψ(x, t)|2 is obtained in multiplying the probability wave
(probability amplitude) with its complex conjugate. Hence, we can write that:
|ψ(x, t)|2 = ψ∗ψ. Please see below (just under (7)) where we provide for an
example.
Hence, we have that:
pA(x, t) ∝ |ψA(x, t)|2 . (4)
Similarly for pB(x, t). Using (4) we can define the so called “quantum state”
as the square root of the probability density function. The quantum state, as
per Khrennikov (2002), “is a purely mathematical quantity used to describe a
rather special behavior of probability densities of ensembles of systems that are
very sensitive to perturbations produced by interactions.”
Since we are using waves, we can use superpositions. We can define:
ψAB(x, t) = ψA(x, t) + ψB(x, t), (5)
where ψAB(x, t) is the superposed state.
The above proportionality relationships can now be used to obtain:
pAB(x, t) ∝ |ψA(x, t) + ψB(x, t)|2 . (6)
Before we move on, we need to introduce a basic notion from the area of
complex numbers. We know that a complex number z can be denoted as z =
x+ iy, where x is the real part and y is the imaginary part. This same number z
can also be written as z = reiθ where r =
√
x2 + y2 and often r can be denoted
as |z|. The angle θ = tan−1 y
x
and x = r cos θ and y = r sin θ. We also say that
|z| is the amplitude and θ is the phase.
We can write the wave function, which is a complex number, in exactly the
same way. Thus, the two components of a wave function are its phase and its
amplitude. The wave function can then be written as follows:
ψA(x, t) = |ψA(x, t)| eiSA(x,t), (7)
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where SA(x, t) is the phase of the wave function and |ψA(x, t)| is its ampli-
tude. We write out ψB(x, t) in the same way.
We note that the complex conjugate, ψ∗A(x, t) is in this case defined as:
ψ∗A(x, t) = |ψA(x, t)| e−iSA(x,t).
Substituting (7), and similarly for ψB(x, t), in (6), we obtain:
pAB(x, t) = |ψA(x, t)|2 + |ψB(x, t)|2 + 2 |ψA(x, t)| |ψB(x, t)| cos(SA − SB). (8)
This is precisely the result which includes probability interference. I.e. the
additional term 2 |ψ1(x, t)| |ψ1(x, t)| cos(S1−S2) when not zero makes probabil-
ity in a quantum context, to be either sub-or super additive. For a much more
in- depth treatment on the comparison of (8) with (2), please see Khrennikov
(2007).
Khrennikov (2002) has indicated that quantum theory is a “special theory
of statistical averages”.
3 The sure-thing principle and the Ellsberg and
Allais paradoxes
The sure-thing principle is a key principle in utility theory. Utility theory has
as its primitive the so called utility function. The fundamental question any
economic theory textbook asks is whether, if good x is preferred over y, one can
find an ‘if and only if’ relationship with a utility function such that the utility
level of x expressed through that utility function is larger than the utility level
of y expressed through that same utility function. The concept of expected
utility makes up the ‘workhorse’ of economic theory and its many applications.
Expected utility can be seen as the average value (probabilistically weighted) of
utility one gets through for instance playing a gamble. This concept will become
clear once we show how the Ellsberg and Allais’ paradoxes can be defined.
It needs to be stressed that economics has a variety of expected utility theo-
ries. The most used (but the least realistic) expected utility approach is the so
called von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) expected utility. The type of proba-
bility used in formulating expected utility, in this model, can be seen, as Kreps
(1988) clearly indicates, as “an objective - externally imposed probability”. At
the opposite end of the expected utility theory spectrum, we can find the so
called Savage expected utility. This form of expected utility was developed by
the famous statistician Leonard Savage (1954). Probability in the Savage model
is entirely determined by the economic agent. Hence, in this model subjective
probability is used in the calculation of expected utility. A mixture of objec-
tive and subjective probability is used in the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) model.
Aumann was the recipient of the recent Nobel Prize in economics.
The sure-thing principle is a key axiom in the Savage expected utility ap-
proach. We can explain the principle in the following way. Let us imagine we
have experiment participants who are instructed to express a preference over
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gambles A and B (set 1) and gambles C and D (set 2). First, they express their
choice of gamble A over gamble B. Second, they express their choice of gamble
C over gamble D. On what basis do the experiment participants express their
choice? The participants are informed of the payoff of the gambles in say, three
states of nature; s1, s2 and s3. Assume that the payoff of gambles in set 1 for
state s3 are identical. Similarly, the payoff of gambles in set 2 for state s3 are
also identical. We note that the identical payoffs in s3 for set 2 maybe different
from the identical payoffs in s3 for set 1. The sure-thing principle says that the
preference of the experiment participants over the two gambles A and B (set 1)
and C and D (set 2) will be unaffected by the identical outcomes in state s3.
Hence, if we were to swap the identical outcomes in s3 for the gambles in set 2
with the identical outcomes in s3 for the gambles in set 1, this would NOT affect
the preference of the experiment participants. As is mentioned in Busemeyer et
al. (2006 and 2007), Shafir and Tversky (1992) have found in many instances
that players do violate this principle. In this paper we do not want to detail
the implications this violation has had on basic economic theory models. An
excellent source which treats this nevertheless important issue is again Kreps
(1988). Economic theory did find a response to this defect. The core papers are
by Gilbao and Schmeidler (1989) and Ghirardato et al. (2004).
Now that we have illustrated the sure-thing principle, we can consider a
famous paradox, known also as the Ellsberg paradox, which implies a violation
of the sure-thing principle. Virtually any textbook in economic theory will give
an outline of this paradox. We describe it in the typical way. Consider the
following experiment. We have an urn with 30 red balls and 60 other balls (blue
and green). We do not know the exact proportion of green and blue balls. We
consider four gambles and we ask experiment participants to express a preference
between gambles 1 and 2 and between gambles 3 and 4. The gamble’s payoffs
are as follows.
1. Gamble 1 (G1): you receive 1 unit of currency (uoc) if you draw a red ball
2. Gamble 2 (G2): you receive 1 unit of currency (uoc) if you draw a blue
ball
3. Gamble 3 (G3): you receive 1 unit of currency (uoc) if you draw a red or
green ball
4. Gamble 4 (G4): you receive 1 unit of currency (uoc) if you draw a blue or
green ball
Most of the experiment participants (and this result has occurred in repeated
experiments) will prefer G1 overG2, G1 ≻ G2. The intuition for such preference
can be explained by the fact that one knows the odds of winning in G1 (i.e.
1/3 probability) but in G2 one is unsure about the odds. Participants in this
experiment also indicated that G4 ≻ G3. Here again, one knows the odds of
winning in G4 are 2/3. However, one is unsure about the odds in G3. Hence,
the odds are ambiguous in G2 and G3.
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This paradox clearly violates the sure-thing principle. This can be easily
shown if we use the following table to summarize the payoffs (in units of cur-
rency):
Red Blue Green
G1 1 0 0
G2 0 1 0
G3 1 0 1
G4 0 1 1
The constant payoffs in set 1 (G1 and G2) and in set 2 (G3 and G4) should
not influence the preferences. Hence, if G1 ≻ G2 then, using the sure-thing prin-
ciple, it should be G3 ≻ G4. As indicated already above, experiment participant
will very often indicate G3 ≺ G4.
Let us denote the probability of drawing a red ball, as pr. We know pr = 1/3.
We can denote the other probabilities in a likewise fashion. From the choice
the experiment participants expressed one can see very quickly that G1 ≻ G2
implies that pr > pb, if we assume that if the units of currency one can gain
would precisely coincide with the level of utility (or satisfaction) of this gain.
Similarly, the choice G4 ≻ G3 would now imply the opposite: pb > pr.
We round off this section with another paradox. This paradox is also widely
known in the economics literature and was first initiated by Economics Nobel
prize winner Maurice Allais. We follow here the example in Wolfram Mathworld
(2007). There are two experiments, consisting each of gambles A and B for
experiment 1 and gambles C and D for experiment 2. We have again four
gambles. The payoff table, where we assume all numbers are in units of currency,
can be expressed as follows:
gambles [1, 33] 34 [35, 100]
A 2500 0 2400
B 2400 2400 2400
C 2500 0 0
D 2400 2400 0
Drawing, in gamble A, balls with numbers in [1, 33] yields 2500uoc. If the
experiment participant were to draw ball number 34 (s)he would have a payoff
of 0uoc. Finally, if the participant were to draw a ball number in [35, 100] it will
yield 2400uoc. Gambles A and C, without the [35, 100] event are identical. So
are gambles B and D without the [35, 100] event. Thus, in this case, if test par-
ticipants were to prefer B ≻ A they should also preferD ≻ C. However, with the
adding of the [35, 100] event, individuals have shown in repeated experiments,
to exhibit the preference: C ≻ D and B ≻ A. If the experiment participant
were to have picked ball number ‘36’ in both gambles A and B then by virtue of
the identical outcome (2400uoc), we would have indifference between gambles
A and B. Similarly, if the experiment participant, were to have picked ball ‘36’
in both gambles C and D, then again there should be indifference between both
gambles. Hence, the [35, 100] event is an independent event. It is intuitive to
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assume that if we add an independent event to an identical experiment, the
choice behavior should not be influenced. Here, the expressed choice exhibited
by the test participants clearly contradicts this.
We can consider an interesting analogy between this paradox and the double
slit experiment. Pietro La Mura (2006) indicates that the particle in the double
slit experiment behaves like a decision maker violating the above experiment.
Says La Mura ”why should it matter to an individual particle which happens
to go through the left slit, when determining where to scatter later on, with
what probability it could have gone through the right slit instead?” Indeed the
event of the particle going through the left slit should be independent from the
event of the particle to go through the right slit. But that is of course not the
case when there is probability interference. Thus, if B is preferred over A then
D should be preferred over C and the action of the independent event should
have no influence. Thus, the probability of going through the right slit should
be of no importance to a particle going through the left slit. This is exactly the
influence of the independent event.
4 Explaining the sure-thing principle with prob-
ability interference: the Busemeyer et al. (2006,
2007) approach
In their important papers Busemeyer et al. (2006 and 2007) discuss how the
violation of the sure-thing principle could be explained with the concept of
probability interference. The experiment they refer to consists of two identical
gambles. The gamble has two states of nature. One state of nature corresponds
to a winning amount of money and the other state to a losing amount of money.
Participants are informed they can play the game twice, in sequence. In this
experiment three situations are distinguished: a) the participant is told (s)he
won in the first play of the gamble; b) the participant is told (s)he lost in the
first play of the gamble; c) the participant is told nothing as to the outcome
of the first play of the gamble. As indicated in Busemeyer et al. (2006 and
2007), if participants prefer to play the second time the gamble, knowing that
they won at the first play, and if they prefer to play the second time the gamble
knowing they lost at the first play, then they should prefer to play a second
time even if they are not told whether they either lost or won at the first play.
This very intuitive prediction is entirely based on the sure-thing principle. The
study by Shafir and Tversky (1992), as quoted in the Busemeyer et al. (2006
and 2007) paper, showed that 69% of experiment participants would go for a
second play knowing that they won in the first play. Furthermore, 59% opted
for a second play when they knew they had lost in the first play. However, 36%
of the participants would NOT play for a second time if they did not know the
outcome of the first play of the gamble. This behavior violates the sure-thing
principle.
Busemeyer et al. (2006 and 2007) define two states of belief about the
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first play that experiment participants can have: win or lose. There are two
states of action experiment participants can take: gamble or not. An experi-
ment participant can simultaneously have beliefs and actions. Those produce
four possible states, which are denoted in the typical quantum physical ‘ket’
way: {|WG >, |WN >, |LG >, |LN >}. Each of the four states, indicates the
simultaneous belief experiment participants have in for instance ‘winning (in
the first play) of the gamble and having an intention to gamble (in a second
play)’ (|WG >) or in for instance ‘losing (in the first play) but having no in-
tention to gamble (in a second play)’ (|LN >). We mentioned in section two
that in quantum physics we define a probability wave or probability ampli-
tude. The state function vector, in the experimental setting here, is defined as:−→
ψ = [ψ
WG
, ψ
WN
, ψ
LG
, ψ
LN
], where each ψ.. is a probability amplitude. The
−→
ψ is
of unit length. We recall also from section two, that we defined |ψ|2 (see (3)) as
proportional to a probability density function. We denote the probability value
as: ‖ψ..‖2. As an example ‖ψWG‖2 indicates the probability value of observing
the state ”winning and gambling in a second play”.
As is indicated in Busemeyer et al. (2006 and 2007), one can represent
‘thought’, which alters the state of the cognitive system, by a unitary operator,
U , such that −→ϕ = U.−→ψ . As an example (see Busemeyer et al. (2006 and 2007)
for more examples) , if the experiment participant receives information she has
lost in the first gamble, then the operator U is applied so as to create a new
state price vector:
−→
ψL = [0, 0, αL , βL ]. Note that in the unknown case we have
the superposition: ψ
U
=
√
pψ
W
+
√
qψ
L
, where
√
p and
√
q are probability
amplitudes.
Busemeyer et al. (2006 and 2007) now introduce the way players select a
strategy. As indicated above, a new state is formed through an operator Ut for
some period of time t, such that: −→ϕ = Ut.−→ψ = [ϕWG , ϕWN , ϕLG , ϕLN ]. The
so called final response probabilities are elements of
−→
φ = M.−→ϕ , where M is
another operator. The elements of this vector are the probabilities of playing a
second time.
Hence, we can, as in Busemeyer et al. (2006 and 2007), define the density
function from which we can determine the total probability of gambling in the
second play. Using the concept of complex conjugate which we discussed in
section two (just under equation (7)), we obtain: |φ|2 = φ∗φ, where φ∗ is
the complex conjugate. The total probability of gambling the second time is:
|φ|2 = (Mϕ)∗ (Mϕ) = |Mϕ
WG
|2 + |Mϕ
LG
|2. Similarly, the total probability of
not gambling the second time is: |Mϕ
WN
|2 + |Mϕ
LN
|2.
How can the probability interference term explain the sure-thing principle
violation? Using the development set out in this section, the probability of
winning is: φ∗WφW = (MUtψW )
∗
(MUtψW ) and similarly for losing: φ
∗
LφL =
(MUtψL)
∗
(MUtψL). Similarly Busemeyer et al. (2006 and 2007) show they
can formulate the probability in the case of the unknown condition, using the
superposition ψ
U
=
√
pψ
W
+
√
qψ
L
. They get: φ∗UφU = (MUtψU )
∗
(MUtψU ) =
(MUt(
√
pψ
W
+
√
qψ
L
))
∗
(MUt(
√
pψ
W
+
√
qψ
L
)) (9)
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and this product can be set equal to:
(
√
pφ
W
+
√
qφ
L
)
∗
(
√
pφ
W
+
√
qφ
L
) (10)
and this is then equal to:
(
pφ∗
W
φ
W
+ qφ∗
L
φL
)
+
√
p
√
qφ∗
W
φ
L
. (11)
What is key is now to remark that if one were to only consider:
φ∗UφU =
(
pφ∗
W
φ
W
+ qφ∗
L
φL
)
(12)
then (12) would indicate that the probability of gambling for a second time,
when the experiment participant has no idea of whether he lost or won in the
first play, should be the average of the probabilities of gambling a second time
when the experiment participant knew that he respectively won and lost in the
first play. The experiments by Tversky and Shafir (1992) have clearly shown
that 36% of the participant would not play for a second time when they did
not know whether they had lost or won in the first play. This falls well below
the 69% of participants playing, knowing they had won in the first play and
the 59% of the participants knowing they had lost in the first play. Hence, it is
clearly the interference term
√
p
√
qφ∗
W
φ
L
, which was already covered in section
2 under (8), which can explain the experimental observation of Tversky and
Shafir (1992).
5 The concept of ‘ambiguity’ in the Ellsberg
paradox
The Ellsberg paradox, as we have seen in section three of this paper violates the
sure-thing principle and it thereby contradicts expected utility theory. Let us
consider, like in Bossaerts at al. (2007), that the red, green and blue balls are fi-
nancial/economic securities. Examples of securities are bonds, shares etc...Each
security pays the same fixed amount (1 unit of currency) according to the draw
of the color. Hence, a ‘red’ security will be a security which pays 1 unit of
currency if a red ball is drawn from the urn of balls. The ‘red’ security is risky
in the sense that the distribution of payoffs is known. However, the number of
‘green’ and ‘blue’ securities are unknown in number. We say, as in Bossaerts et
al. (2007), that the ‘blue’ and ‘green’ securities are ambiguous. In other words,
the distribution of their payoffs, in the Ellsberg paradox is unknown. We also
reported the fact, in section three, that the probability of drawing red is larger
than the probability of drawing blue, pr > pb, when experiment participants
expressed the preference: G1 ≻ G2. However, when experiment participants
expressed the preference of G4 ≻ G3, the opposite occurred: pr < pb. If the
price of the ‘red’ security, qr, were to be tied to the knowledge of probability
(and of course prize winning or not), then clearly the price of the ‘red’ security
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should exceed the price of the ‘blue’ security (in gambles 1 and 2): qr > qb.
However, in gambles 3 and 4, the opposite effect occurs: qr < qb.
Let us now assume, still as in Bossaerts et al. (2007), that gambles 1 and 2
would refer to one market. Let us denote this market, as market X . Moreover,
let us assume that gambles 3 and 4 refer to another market, say market Y.
It is quite straightforward to observe that one can simultaneously buy a red
security in market Y and sell an identically same red security in market X .
Similarly, we can simultaneously buy the blue security in the X market and sell
an identically same blue security in the Y market. Such simultaneous buying
and selling, without incurring risk, in two different markets is also known as
‘arbitrage’.
Hence, the Ellsberg paradox is equivalent to the existence of an arbitrage
opportunity. As we have attempted to illustrate above, this paradox can be
explained via the probability interference argument. Hence, it may seem rea-
sonable to explain arbitrage via the probability interference argument.
Before entering into the next section, we need to stress that the concept
of ‘arbitrage’ is an essential concept in the theory of security (or also asset)
pricing. For instance, the theory of derivative pricing (Black and Scholes (1973))
is heavily dependent on the arbitrage concept. Most of the theoretical work in
asset pricing relies heavily on the so called ‘non-arbitrage’ theorem (Harrison
and Kreps (1979)). This theorem, indicates that for the case of a discrete state
space, there will be no-arbitrage if and only if there exists a set of risk-neutral
probabilities. Risk-neutral probabilities can be thought of as probabilities which
allow the discounting of a risky asset with the help of a risk free rate of interest.
This property is of capital importance in asset pricing. See Etheridge (2002)
for an excellent treatment. Kabanov and Stricker (2005) deal with the theorem
in the context of a continuous state space. Duffie (1996) discusses the proof of
the theorem. We propose that those risk-neutral probabilities could be mapped
onto the probabilities defined from ‖ψ‖2, where the latter quantity was already
discussed in section four above. In fact, we can be even more explicit, by writing:
‖ψ(x)‖2 =
∫ a2
a1
|ψ(x)|2 dx, (13)
where we have assumed time independence. For a set of bounds on the
integral, {a1, a2} we have a precise probability value on the left hand side of the
above equality. The probability density function is |ψ(x)|2. We now imagine
that the set of risk-neutral probabilities needed to ensure no arbitrage can be
drawn, for a given |ψ(x)|2, from the different sets of bounds {ai, aj} used in
(13).
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6 Modelling information via the use of the wave
function
In this section we briefly exhibit how the wave function we defined in section two,
equation (7), can be used to model information. We recall that the wave function
was defined as: ψ(x, t) = |ψ(x, t)| eiS(x,t), where |ψ(x, t)| is the amplitude of the
wave function and S(x, t) is the phase of the wave function. We use x and t to
denote respectively position and time.
The rationale for using such a wave function in the context of information,
is to convince the reader that a basic quantum mechanical tool like a wave
function can be used to model ‘ambiguity’ (which we find back in the Ellsberg
paradox (please see section five above)) and ‘ignorance about ambiguity’. We
will discuss the relationship of the wave function with ambiguity and ‘ignorance
about ambiguity’ in respectively sections seven and eight below.
The use of a wave function as an information function was already proposed
in 1993 through the important work of Bohm and Hiley (1993). The authors
considered the information wave function as a so called ‘pilot wave’ (wherefrom
the name of pilot wave theory) steering a particle. The pilot wave function
interpretation has deep roots in quantum physics. Prince Louis de Broglie came
up, as early as 1929, with his interpretation of the wave function by saying that
such function (p. 16 in Holland (1993)): ”..not only does...determine the likely
location of a particle it also influences the location by exerting a force on the
orbit.” David Bohm in two seminal papers (1952) took up the thread where de
Broglie had left off. We do not want to go into any detail on this theory but
it is sufficient to say that Bohm and Hiley (1993) compare the pilot wave to a
radio wave which steers a ship on automatic pilot. Pioneering work in using this
information wave function in a macro-scopic (economics) setting was performed
by Andrei Khrennikov (1999; 2002; 2004) and also by Olga Choustova (2006;
2007). Haven (2005; 2007) has attempted to use this set up in a financial options
(and more general pricing) context.
We can use the information wave idea in the basic notion of probability value
we defined in equation (13) above. A change in information could be reflected
by a change in the functional form of the (information) wave function, ψ(x, t).
This change would have as consequence that the probability value would change
because of a change in information. Hence, we can obtain a set of probabilities
which trigger arbitrage by simply changing the information wave function and
keeping the same bounds {ai, aj}. We come back to this issue in the next
section.
7 The wave function and ambiguity
Let us re-visit once more the Ellsberg paradox of sections three and five. We
recall the payoffs:
1. Gamble 1 (G1): you receive 1 unit of currency (uoc) if you draw a red ball
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2. Gamble 2 (G2): you receive 1 unit of currency (uoc) if you draw a blue
ball
3. Gamble 3 (G3): you receive 1 unit of currency (uoc) if you draw a red or
green ball
4. Gamble 4 (G4): you receive 1 unit of currency (uoc) if you draw a blue or
green ball
We had 30 red balls and 60 blue and green balls. We do not know the
proportions of blue or green balls.
An experiment participant may reason that it is ‘fair’ to assume there are an
equal amount of green and blue balls. We note that in using this ‘fair’ argument
ambiguity has been completely ruled out3. Hence, the chance of drawing any
of the balls, in any of the four gambles is 30/90. In this case we would be
indifferent between gambles 1 and 2, and between gambles 3 and 4.
Therefore, if the price of the red security, qr, is again tied to the knowledge
of probability then the price of the red security should now be equal to the price
of the blue security (in gambles 1 and 2): qr = qb. Furthermore, the price of
the red security is equal to the price of the blue security in gambles 3 and 4:
qr = qb. Thus, with the 50/50 rule there is no possibility for arbitrage: i.e. we
can not simultaneously buy and sell in two different markets and make a riskless
profit. In fact, it is precisely the existence of ambiguity which has created the
arbitrage opportunity.
Let us re-consider the role the wave function can play as an information
function in (13). We start from the assumption there is no arbitrage. In this
case the information wave function, ψ(x, t), would contain a precise piece of
information. I.e. the precise piece of information would be: “we have a 50/50
chance of getting a blue or green ball (i.e. security)” or alternatively “the price
of the red security is equal to the price of the blue security in all gambles”. Any
departure from this, i.e. a change in the information wave function, ψ(x, t),
which brings us back into ambiguity, will yield arbitrage. Hence, a departure of
the information wave function from the 50/50 rule (or any other idiosyncratic
- subjective probability assessment), steers us away from expected utility and
brings us into ambiguity and therefore arbitrage.
8 The wave function and ignorance about am-
biguity
We can go one step further by attempting to model ignorance about ambiguity.
To achieve this purpose we need to first inquire how ignorance could be mod-
3Using the 50/50 rule would indicate one is using the principle of insufficient reason (Kreps,
p. 146) - which says: ”if (one) has no reason to suspect that one outcome is more likely than
another, then by reasons of symmetry the outcomes are equally likely and hence equally likely
probabilities can be ascribed to them.” This argument can be challenged. For instance, one
could look at the uncertainty concerning the true value p of picking up a green or blue ball as
a prior (Kreps, p. 149).
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elled with basic quantum mechanical tools. In a very interesting paper, Franco
(2007) provides for convincing arguments on how to model so called ‘rational
ignorance’. Rational ignorance comes into existence when the cost of having
to inform oneself about an issue outweighs the benefits of knowing about that
issue. Franco (2007) defines an opinion state, which is a qubit. In a quantum
state, there exists a linear superposition of 0 and 1:
a|0 > +b|1 >, (14)
where |0 >=
(
1
0
)
and |1 >=
(
0
1
)
and a, b ∈ C. The superposition reflects
the existence of ignorance.
A so called ‘ket’, |s > , is a row vector and the dual vector is a so called ‘bra’,
< s′|. The inner product is denoted as < s′|s >: the probability amplitude.
Furthermore, as expected, |< s′|s >|2 is the probability to get state s′ as a result
of the measure on state s| >.
Franco (2007) uses the following well known quantum mechanics terms:
• a Hermitian operator4 which corresponds to an observable quantity
• eigenvalues are the measurable values of the observable
• eigenvectors |a >, correspond to the quantum state (example: |0 > and
|1 >)
As in Franco (2007), three matrices which are Hermitian operators, are in-
troduced:
σx =
[
0 1
1 0
]
;σy =
[
0 −i
i 0
]
;σz =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
(15)
Those matrices, also known under the name of ‘Pauli matrices’ have as
property that σ2i = I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
. Also, the determinants of each σi = −1 and
the trace (i.e. the sum of the diagonal elements) is in each σi = 0.
The eigenvalues of those operators define three orthonormal basises. Each
eigenvector of one basis is an equal superposition of the eigenvector of any of the
other basises. Those basises, Franco (2007) reports, are called mutually unbi-
ased. The eigenvectors are then respectively {|0 >, |1 >} ;
{
|0>+|1>√
2
, |0>−|1>√
2
}
;{
|0>+i|1>√
2
, |0>−i|1>√
2
}
, where i is a complex number. The Pauli matrices have
eigenvalues of ± 1/2. The physical realization of a qubit is provided for by a
spin 1/2 particle (f.i. an electron).
4Hermiticity is the key property all quantum mechanical operators must possess so that
they can represent an observable (or physically measurable quantity). Consider an op-
erator bQ, then this operator is Hermitian if for any state function, ψ, we have that:R
all space
ψ1
h bQψ2
i
dv =
R
all space
h bQψ1
i
ψ2dv. Please see Morrison (1990) for an excellent
overview.
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The observable quantities can be associated to questions such that they give
the answers 0 (false) or 1 (true) (the eigenvalues). The vectors |0 > and |1 >
are associated to the answers 0 and 1 (true or false). The vectors , |0 > and
|1 > are the truth values.
In order to force the Pauli matrices to have eigenvalues ± 1, Franco (2007)
considers the projector operator:
ˆ
P z = (I − σz)/2 which yields eigenvalues of 0
and 1. The associated eigenvectors are thus |0 > and |1 >. The observable
ˆ
P z
is, in the context of rational ignorance, associated to a first question asked to
participants.
Franco (2007) then defines two other observables
ˆ
, P y = (I − σy)/2 and
ˆ
P x = (I − σx)/2 which can be associated with a second question. By virtue
of the construction of
ˆ
P z ,
ˆ
P y,
ˆ
P x(the mutually unbiasedness), the answers to
those observables (questions) are statistically independent.
As an example, Franco (2007), starts with question
ˆ
P z which has either 0 or
1 as an answer and the associated eigenvectors are |0 > and |1 >. Now consider
another question,
ˆ
P x, which has as associated eigenvectors
|0>+|1>√
2
or |0>−|1>√
2
for the 0 and 1 eigenvalues. Here the eigenvectors are clearly superposed. They
express thus ignorance. The inner product calculates the probability amplitude
(and the square is the probability). In this case we obtain thus a probability of
1/2 for obtaining either 0 or 1.
Now assume, again as in Franco (2007) that we have experiment participants
who are first being asked question
ˆ
P z. This operator is having as eigenvectors
|0 > and |1 >. There is no superposition. Hence, no ignorance. Now assume,
there is another question posed to the experiment participants: question 2,
ˆ
P x. The eigenvectors are now
|0>+|1>√
2
or |0>−|1>√
2
. The probability amplitude
in this case, can for instance be calculated by using the inner product of |0 >
(eigenvector of question 1) and |0>±|1>√
2
(eigenvector of question 2), yielding
1/
√
2. This yields a probability of 1/2.
As is very clearly indicated in Franco (2007) when the experiment participant
gives an answer to the second question, the eigenvector |0 > will collapse to say
|0>+|1>√
2
for the answer ‘0’. The experiment participant has expressed ignorance
since there is superposition. If question 1 is asked now again, then what is the
probability amplitude? The eigenvector |0>+|1>√
2
will now collapse to say |1 >
for the answer ’1’ and the inner product will be formed out of |0>+|1>√
2
and |1 >.
As is aptly remarked in Franco (2007), one observes now that the same question
may get a different answer, since there is a 50% probability to get answer ‘1’.
Hence, the context of asking has changed the answer to the question.
The development above can be applied to arbitrage. In their quest to make
arbitrage profits, banks employ entire research departments to uncover such
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opportunities. Proprietary data sets are developed to uncover arbitrage oppor-
tunities. Let us denote the cost of such datasets as the price of information.
Using an analogy with the rational ignorance concept, how do we know that
information prices can outweigh the benefit of an arbitrage opportunity? This
is not an obvious question.
To revert back to the notion of ambiguity and arbitrage we discussed when
we considered the Ellsberg paradox, we could claim that the very existence of
an ambiguity in the financial markets leads to an arbitrage opportunity. In
the context of the Ellsberg paradox, rational ignorance would consist of not
believing that a potential set of arbitrage opportunities can be economically
viable for it to be investigated.
However, here we would like to tackle ‘ignorance about ambiguity’. Let us
think of some financial asset whose price may have the potential for arbitrage
taking. We have two questions, asked in sequence, to the research department
of a bank. The questions are answered with either false (‘0’) or true (‘1’).
The probability of this is also assessed. For instance, in the first question we
ask whether, the price of the red security is higher than the price of the blue
security, qr > qb in market X. The potential answer in a superposition of 0 and
1 will influence the probability as we have seen above. In question 2, we ask
whether qr < qb in market Y . If on both questions, the research department
of the bank, answers without any superposition, then this would indicate there
is no ignorance at all about ambiguity. If the answers are correct (i.e. they
recognize the correct inequality for each market X and Y ) then there will exist
an arbitrage opportunity.
What if the research department of the bank answers the questions with
superposition? Clearly, there would be ignorance about ambiguity and hence
the bank would not realize an arbitrage opportunity.
We could translate this into the following equations. Using an extension on
(13) (see also Choustova (2006)):
‖Ψ‖2 =
∫ q2
q1
|Ψ(q)|2 dM(q), (16)
where M(q) is a probability measure and where {q1, q2} are information
prices. We imagine that the research department of a bank is researching an
arbitrage opportunity. Hence, the set of information prices now changes from
{q1, q2} → {q′1, q′2}. Assume we ask the two questions, we described above, to
the research department. We claim that the ignorance about ambiguity can
be captured by M(q). So if for question 1, we obtain non-superposed answers,
then:
1 =
∫ q2
q1
|Ψ(q)|2 dM(q) (17)
For question 2, assume we have no ignorance about ambiguity then:
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1 =
∫ q′
2
q′
1
|Ψ(q)|2 dM ′(q) (18)
, where M(q) 6= M ′(q). As we have indicated at the end of section five and
at the end of section six, the arbitrage probability is influenced by the informa-
tion wave function. The existence of ambiguity, in the context of the Ellsberg
paradox, vouches for an arbitrage opportunity. So the arbitrage probability is
then:
1/x =
∫ q′
2
q′
1
|Ψ′(q)|2 dM ′(q), x ≥ 1 (19)
, where |Ψ′(q)|2 6= |Ψ(q)|2.
Thus, if we have that
∫ q2
q1
|Ψ(q)|2 dM(q) 6= ∫ q′2
q′
1
|Ψ(q)|2 dM ′(q) then there is
ignorance about ambiguity and we can assume there is no arbitrage opportunity.
Thus, in summary, ignorance about ambiguity is reflected by a probabil-
ity which is dependent on the superposition of the true and false statements,
expressing ignorance about ambiguity.
9 Experimental set up: how to test for proba-
bility interference in a macro-scopic setting?
The work by Busemeyer et al. (2006 and 2007) indicates that probability in-
terference can explain the violations of the sure-thing principle. The Ellsberg
paradox was a showcase paradox indicating a violation of the sure-thing princi-
ple. We have tried to show how the information wave function can be modelled
in the context of the Ellsberg paradox. Following the work of Franco (2007)
basic quantum physical principles were used to model rational ignorance. We
used this set up to define ignorance about ambiguity.
All of the presented material so far has tried to implicitly highlight the
importance of using quantum physical principles in instances of violations of
the sure-thing principle. The most important question, hence becomes whether
we can prove, or at least test for the existence of probability interference in a
macro-scopic setting?
9.1 Using probability interference in social science: gen-
eral set-up
We follow in this subsection the work by Khrennikov (2002). Assume there exists
two mutually exclusive features A and B. Each feature has a dual outcome, ‘0’
or ‘1’. The outcome ‘0’ in features A and B is denoted as respectively a1 and b1.
Similarly, the outcome ‘1’ in features A and B can be denoted as respectively
a2 and b2. There exists an ensemble of experiment participants, Σ who have the
same mental state. The ensemble probability is denoted as paj and is defined as:
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paj =
number of results aj
total number of elements in Σ
. (20)
Similarly for pbj . A new ensemble Σ needs to be prepared to perform the
measurement pbj .
Ensembles, Σai and Σ
b
i ; i = 1, 2 need then to be prepared and they have
states corresponding to the values of A = aj and B = bj ; j = 1, 2. The following
probability is then defined:
p
a|b
ij =
number of results aj for the ensemble Σ
b
i
total number of elements in Σbi
. (21)
Likewise for p
b|a
ij . From classical probability theory, total probability is de-
fined as:
paj = p
b
1p
a|b
1j + p
b
2p
a|b
2j ; j = 1, 2. (22)
A likewise definition can be made for pbj.
In the presence of probability interference, one obtains (see also section 2 in
this paper):
paj = p
b
1p
a|b
1j + p
b
2p
a|b
2j + 2
√
pb1p
b
2p
a|b
1j p
a|b
2j cos θj ; j = 1, 2; (23)
where cos θj is defined as:
cos θj =
paj − pb1pa|b1j + pb2pa|b2j
2
√
pb1p
b
2p
a|b
1j p
a|b
2j
. (24)
As we have already remarked in section 2, with equation (8), if the cos θj in
(23) is non zero, then this would be indicative of the existence of quantum-like
behavior of cognitive systems. A likewise definition can be made for pbj .
9.2 Description and discussion of the proposed experi-
ment
In this subsection of the paper we will propose the conjecture we want to test.
We also briefly describe the test we envisage. We note that the test description
which we will explain below does not contain the minute details of the experi-
mental set up. We only provide for a fairly general discussion of how we could
possibly test our conjecture.
In basic terms the experiment deals with having experiment participants
recognize a list of songs from a pre-determined list of songs. The tempo of each
of the songs is distorted by either lenghtening or shortening the tempo. We use
the definition of tempo as in Levitin and Cook (1996): “...the amount of time it
takes a given note or the average number of beats occurring in a given interval
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of time, usually beats per minute.” Kuhn (1974) defines, beat tempo, in a very
similar way as: “...the rate of speed of a composition.”
The time of listening exposure the test participants are allowed so as to
recognize each of the songs varies. The time of exposure is lengthened when the
tempo is increased. However, the time of exposure is shortened when the tempo
of songs is decreased. The rationale for this time variation is discussed below.
The experiment participants are divided into several groups. We first want
to discuss the ‘normed’ group. Levitin and Cook (1996) in an experiment on
tempo recognition asked experiment participants to sing tunes of songs they
themselves had picked from a list of available songs. They examined how well
the participants could mimic the tempo of each of the chosen songs. In their
experimental set up they formed a group of experiment participants (250 stu-
dents) who would fill in questionnaires which would allow, what Levitin and
Cook (1996) called ‘norming’. This questionnaire, in the words of Levitin and
Cook (1996), “asked them (the test participants) to indicate songs that they
knew well and could hear playing in their heads.” Experiment participants in
the ‘normed’ group, in our study, will do exactly that: indicate songs they know
well. It will be important to choose songs which we can term as being ‘best
known’. However, we may want to make sure we use songs from different mu-
sic categories. In a study by Collier and Collier (1994) the authors examine
tempo differences in different types of music (like jazz and other types). The
authors find that the tempo differences are quite tied to the music genre in
question. Furthermore, Attneave and Olson (1971) indicate that the size of a
music interval is dependent on the level of frequency of the music.
In the Levitin and Cook (1996) study, the 250 students we mentioned above,
were all taken from the Psychology 101 course. Those students were given the
questionnaire and from their answers the experimenters chose 58 CD’s. It is im-
portant to stress that our experiment proposal does not really follow the Levitin
and Cook (1996) study closely, since we ask instead from participants to recog-
nize songs we randomly play from the list we selected from the choice of songs
the ‘normed’ group puts forward. In our experimental set up, the experiment
participants have to recognize songs we play for them when tempo and time of
exposure is varied. In the Levitin and Cook (1996) study participants are asked
to sing or hum a song for a time the participant selects him/herself and the
obtained tempo is then compared with the copyrighted song’s tempo.
Besides the normed group, we have two other groups of experiment partici-
pants. We note that none of the members of the ‘normed’ group will participate
in the experiment itself. We have therefore two other groups. Group 1 whose
participants are subjected to song excerpts where tempo decreases are randomly
injected in each song. The time of listening exposure for each song is short. Par-
ticipants in group 2 will be subjected to song excerpts where tempo increases
are randomly injected in each song. The time of the listening exposure for each
song is longer than in each of the songs used in group 1.
The rationale for the variation of the exposure time comes from a study
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by Kuhn (1974)5 where it was found that test participants were better able
to detect tempo decreases rather than tempo increases. Kuhn (1974) indicates
that a study by Farnsworth (1969) showed that the “listener is most likely to
change affective terms with which he describes a piece of music whenever its
tempo is appreciably slowed or hastened.”6 Kuhn (1974) in his experiment set
up, where he solely used professional musicians, showed that the beat tempos
which had been decreased were identified faster (in a statistically significant
way) than beat tempos which had been increased. Kuhn (1974) indicates those
results also had been obtained, independently, in a study by Drake (1968). In
more general terms the work by Drake and Botte (1993) addressed a fairly
similar problem. They had subjects listen to two identical sequences (except for
their tempo difference). One sequence had a higher tempo than the other. The
subjects were asked to indicate which sequence was faster.
We note that the tempo experiments by Kuhn (1974) did not make use of
music. However, the Kuhn (1988) study does provide for this. In this study
mention is made of the work by Geringer and Madsen (1984) which actually
finds, in the context of orchestral music, that tempo increases were more easily
identified than tempo decreases.
The Kuhn (1988) study provides for a rich context in which one can appreci-
ate how tempo changes can be affected by extraneous variables such as melody
activity and audible steady beats. The study finds that when melody activ-
ity and audible steady beat were kept constant, the experiment participants
(the participants were students at an elementary school with a very strong mu-
sic programme) could distinguish well between slow and fast tempi. However,
experiment results in this study showed that melody activity clearly affected
tempo perception but there was much less certainty as to how tempo recogni-
tion is affected when audible beat was considered. It needs to be stressed that,
according to Kuhn (1988) there exists a sizable literature which documents there
is ambiguity in tempo perception. Kuhn (1988) cites work by (amongst others)
Madsen, Duke and Geringer (1986) and Wang and Salzberg (1984). One way
out, as suggested in Kuhn (1988), is then maybe to only use musicians as exper-
iment participants in groups 1 and 2 (besides the normed group participants).
Says Kuhn (1988) “some researchers believe that only trained, sophisticated
musicians can correctly interpret and perceive ‘tempo’ as it is usually defined.”
Khrennikov and Haven (2006) have described an experiment where we can
test for the same type of variables (time and degree of deformation) by using
instead a database of pictures. This experiment formed part of a funding bid
the authors wrote for the Fund for Scientific Research (FWO)7 of the Flemish
Government (Belgium)8.
Two features of the song recognition are being compared:
1. time of processing of the songs (see also section 9.4. for more discussion
5Also reported in the Levitin and Cook (1996) paper
6Kuhn’s (1974) study also discusses rythm besides beat. We omit it here.
7‘FWO’ is the abbreviation in Dutch for ”Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek”.
8We could also imagine an experiment where we test for deformations of both verbal and
photograpic memory.
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on this parameter)
2. the ability to recognize a song, S0 by analyzing a deformation S of it (see
also section 9.4.)
We denote the time of processing of the song with the variable t. The ability
to recognize the song with tempo deformations which are either increasing or
decreasing, is denoted with the variable a.
The conjecture we want to test is:
Conjecture 9.1 t and a are complementary.
9.2.1 Preparation
The state preparation of the experiment can be described as follows. The ex-
perimental context (state) C is given by a sequence of songs, S1, ..., Sm. The
experiment participants form a group G and each of the participants are ex-
posed to all the songs (from the distillated list of songs taken from the normed
group) excerpts they will hear. The context allows thus the experiment partic-
ipants to learn the songs (some of the songs they surely will know, but some
they may not know as well (or not at all)).
In the Levitin and Cook (1996) study only 46 students were selected for the
tempo recognition experiment. After learning has taken place, the group G is
randomly divided into two equal subgroups G1 and G2.
9.2.2 First experiment: song tempo decreases and short exposure
time
A first experiment is performed with experiment participants from group G1.
As in Levitin and Cook (1996), test participants are seated in a so called sound
attenuation booth. Each of the participants is then subjected to a battery of
songs (selected from our ‘best’ songs (from the normed group)) played sequen-
tially. Each of the songs is played for the same amount of time. In this first
experiment, the tempo of each of the songs is decreased and the exposure time
(to listen to the song) is kept uniformly short9. Experiment participants must
choose from the full list of songs which song they are listening to. Songs in the
full list are indicated (alphabetically) by the name of the singer or composer.
Next to the authors’ name is the title of the song and the record company own-
ing the copyright of the song. We also note that experiment participants need to
pick the song from the list within a uniformly prescribed time interval. This is
a possible issue of contention. Kuhn (1974) reports that professional musicians
need less time to respond to a tempo change and they make also less mistakes
than non-professional musicians. A study related to this issue is Kuhn’s 1975
paper which reports that on a longitudonal basis, test participants (of all walks
of life) when asked to keep a constant tempo, seem to instead increase tempo.
9The ‘shortness’ of the exposure time is obviously a calibration issue. Please see below for
some beginning discussion on this topic.
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Since our study would not necessarily contain test participants who are only
musicians, setting the response time too short could thus create a negative bias.
The low tempo songs S′1, ..., S
′
m are deformations of the original songs S1, ..., Sm.
The tempo change could be fine tuned in the wayMadsen and Graham (1970)(see
also Kuhn (1974)) have proposed. Those authors propose a modulation rate (of
tempo) of one beat per minute change every second.
Experiment participants in group G1 are subjected to listening to S
′
1, ..., S
′
m
and also to listening to a few other songs which have not been part of the
training sample. We denote this set of songs as: SG1 . The width of the time
window, w is a parameter of the experiment.
The task the experiment participants have to fulfill is to indicate whether
they either recognize or not the songs SG1 as modifications of the songs S1, ..., Sm.
We can make this experiment a little more sophisticated by using the procedure
Levitt (1971) used. See also Drake and Botte (1993) where the Levitt approach
is described. Levitt (1971) would decrease the tempo difference between two
subsequent sequences by 1%, if the subjects gave two correct answers (to the
two prior sequences). In some sense the tempo decrease compensates for the
shorter period which is given. We could also make it increasingly harder for test
participants by instead increasing the tempo for every correct answer. We do
not follow this strategy in this paper.
Let ω be an experiment participant from group G1 performing this task. We
set t(ω) = 1 if ω was able to give the correct answers for x% of the songs in
SG1 . And t(ω) = 0 in the opposite case.
We now find probabilities P (t = 1|C) and P (t = 0|C) through counting
numbers of experiment participants who gave answers t = 1 and t = 0, respec-
tively. We denote respective subgroups of experiment participants by G1(t = 1)
and G1(t = 0), respectively. The first subgroup consists of experiment partici-
pants who have the ability to perform song recognition (with tempo decrease)
‘quickly’ and the second subgroup consists of experiment participants who do
not possess that feature.
9.2.3 Second experiment: song tempo increase and long exposure
time
The second experiment is performed with experiment participants from the
group G2 as well as the subgroups G1(t = 0) and G1(t = 1) of the first subgroup
G1.
The song deformations now are based on song tempo increases which as per
the experiment of Kuhn (1974), are deformations which are harder to recognize.
We denote those deformations as S′′1 , ..., S
′′
m of initial songs S1, ..., Sm. As in
the first experiment, ‘unknown’ songs will be added to the group of songs. We
denote the set of essentially deformed songs (with the ‘unknown’ songs): SG2 .
The task the experiment participants have to fulfill is identical to the task
described in experiment one: can the participants recognize the songs in SG2 as
modifications of the initial songs S1, ..., Sm?
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The time window in experiment 2 is now longer than in experiment 1. The
width of the time window, w is a parameter of the experiment.
Let ω be an experiment participant performing this task. We set a(ω) = 1
if ω was able to give the correct answers for x% of images in the series. And
a(ω) = 0 in the opposite case.
We now find probabilities P (a = 1|C) and P (a = 0|C) through counting
numbers of experiment participants in the group G2 who gave answers a = 1
and a = 0, respectively. We denote respective subgroups of experiment partici-
pants by G2(a = 1) and G2(a = 0), respectively. The first subgroup consists of
experiment participants who have the ability to perform song recognition (with
tempo increase) quickly and the second subgroup consists of experiment partic-
ipants who do not possess that feature. Because of the tempo increase, we note
that the emphasize in experiment two is on the carefulness of recognizing the
deformation of a song.
Here again, we could use the Levitt (1971) approach. We can increase (or
decrease) with 1% the tempo between subsequent songs if the test participant
has given two correct answers.
9.3 Sub (super) additivity
Using the above experiment, we find probabilities P (a = β|t = α); α, β = 0, 1,
by counting the number of people in the group G1(t = α) who gave the answer
a = β.
After this we calculate the coefficient λ (which is the third term in equation
(23)) and we find the angle θ which gives us the measure of complementarity of
variables t and a. If λ > 1, we would find experimental evidence of probabilistic
behavior which is neither quantum nor classical. We could also consider λ(w)
and even make λ dependent on both w and the degree of deformation. This
degree of deformation could be expressed by using the tempo measure defined
by Levitin and Cook (1996).
We note that sub-additive probability is a concept which has already been
studied in psychology. It has been shown that when experiment participants
have to express their degree of beliefs on a [0,1] interval, probabilistic additivity
will be violated in many cases and sub-additivity obtains. See Bearden et al.
(2005) for a good overview. Bearden et al. (2005) also indicate that such sub-
additivity has been obtained with experiment participants belonging to various
industry groups, such as option traders for instance (Fox et al. (1996)). The
key work pertaining to the issue of sub-additivity in psychology is by Tversky
and Koehler (1994) and Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997). Their theory, also
known under the name of ‘Support Theory’ is in the words of Tversky and
Koehler (1994) “...a theory in which the judged probability of an event depends
on the explicitness of its description.” In other words, it is not the event which
is important as such but its description. In Tversky and Koehler (1994) the
authors highlight the ‘current’ state of affairs (Anno 1994) on the various in-
terpretations subjective probability may have. Amongst the interpretations is
Zadeh’s possibility theory (1978) and the upper and lower probability approach
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of Suppes (1974). The paper by Dubois and Prade (1988), also mentioned in
the Tversky and Koehler (1994) article, provides for an excellent overview on
non-additive probability approaches.
9.4 Complementarity of t and a
Can the conjecture 9.1. we posed at the beginning of this section make sense
from a quantum mechanical point of view? As is well known, there does not
exist a quantum operator on time at all! As we have remarked in Khrennikov
and Haven (2006) there exist a very well known test of complementarity, based
on the Heisenberg uncertainty relation which says that the product of the uncer-
tainties in the determination of position (∆p =
√
E(p− Ep)2) and momentum
(∆p =
√
E(p− Ep)2) is weakly larger than the Planck constant divided by
two. However, as we remarked in Khrennikov and Haven (2006), this method
can not be applied for discrete variables, since if operators have discrete spec-
tra there exist eigenstates (corresponding to eigenvalues) and their standard
deviation equals to zero. Hence, it is not possible to find an uncertainty prin-
ciple of the type: ∆t.∆a = hcogn/2, where hcogn is an analog of the Planck
constant. Discussions on analogs of Planck constants in financial contexts and
other non-quantum physical contexts were provided for in Choustova (2006;
2007), Khrennikov (2004) and Haven (2005; 2007).
The very objective of our experiment is just to overcome those problems of
measurement and hence to be able to test for complementarity on the t and a
variables.
10 Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to show how probability interference, which is an
essential quantum physical concept can be found back in a macro-scopic set-
ting, more precisely in a social science setting. Such interference can help in
explaining major economic paradoxes and the very paradoxes themselves have
quite some interesting ramifications. Therefore, testing for the presence of such
interference on a macro-scopic scale is an interesting challenge. In this paper
we provide for such a possible experiment.
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